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the Five eSSayS contained in this issue of The Eastern Buddhist address the theme of socially engaged Buddhism in new ways. Proceeding from 
early to late in their historical focus, Ji Zhe, Julia Huang, Kory Goldberg, 
and Hakamata Shun’ei (introduced and translated by Jonathan Watts) offer 
studies on new dimensions of Buddhist social engagement. Each reflects on 
how the term might be applied to specific persons and groups active after 
World War II. We will refer to these essays below, providing more detailed 
summaries at the end of this piece. Our own contribution proposes new 
parameters for the analytical use of this category.
We offer a revised definition of socially engaged Buddhism specifically 
tailored for scholarly use. This definition has emerged out of our respective 
studies of Buddhist movements active during the first half of the twentieth 
century in Japan and China, a historical period to which the label “socially 
engaged” is rarely applied.1 Normally, scholars give this label to groups 
We Would like to thank those who offered feedback on earlier drafts of this article, 
including Anne Murphy, Jason Young, Melissa Curley, and two anonymous reviewers. Their 
suggestions and criticisms have made the piece stronger. All errors, however, remain the 
responsibility of the authors.
1 Ip (2009a, pp. 148–52) considers similar phenomena in her discussion of the labels 
“humanistic Buddhism,” and “engaged Buddhism,” before settling on the language of “Bud­
dhist activism” to examine specific prewar Chinese Buddhists’ enactments of modernity. Ip 
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founded after World War II that take traditional Buddhist beliefs, practices, 
and moral precepts and apply them to social projects such as “stopping war, 
promoting human rights, ministering to the victims of disease and disaster, 
and safeguarding the natural environment.”2 These groups are progressive 
and moral in ways expected of religion in the geopolitical and ideological 
situation of the postwar period,3 one in which overtly nationalistic and 
political religion has been increasingly problematized. However, it should be 
mentioned that this trend is most true of liberal democratic and communist 
regimes, as there are cultural-nationalist forms of social engagement flour-
ishing in specific Asian countries.
This revised definition allows us to construct a list—by no means exhaus-
tive—of examples of advocates or organizers, beginning with the prewar 
period. As such, figures like Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837–1911), Tan Sitong 譚
嗣同 (1865–1898), Watanabe Kaikyoku 渡辺海旭 (1872–1933), Khanh Hoa 
(1877–1947), Han Yongun 韓龍雲 (1879–1944), Takeuchi Ryō’on 武内了
温 (1891–1968), and Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947) can be considered socially 
engaged in their rhetoric or practice.4 Next come figures who came of age 
during the conflicts that wracked Asia in the middle of the twentieth century 
and hold global and postcolonial perspectives. The works of figures such as B. 
R. Ambedkar (1891–1956), Thich Nhat Hanh (b. 1926), and the Fourteenth 
Dalai Lama (Tenzin Gyatso, b. 1935), exhibit these perspectives, although 
helpfully notes that Chinese and Taiwanese forms have only been included under the rubric 
of socially engaged within the last decade (2009a, p. 150).
2 Queen 2004, p. 248.
3 One case that reveals the contours of these expectations is the Sōka Gakkai. Queen (1996a, 
pp. 3–4) relates how critics point to its wealth, political activities, exclusivity, proselytization, 
and the public image of its leader, Daisaku Ikeda 池田大作 (b. 1928), as somehow unseemly 
for an engaged Buddhist organization. See also Metraux (1996), Stone (2003), and 
McLaughlin (2012). McLaughlin (2012, pp. 56–58) presents a lucid discussion of secularist 
and opportunist opposition to Sōka Gakkai in the postwar period. In our definition, however, 
there is no barrier to considering types of moral reasoning or specific campaigns deployed 
by this large organization to be socially engaged.
4 Prewar figures are identified less frequently. Goldfuss (2001) presents analysis of 
Yang’s career, and Ip (2009a) discusses the pro-national and pro-capitalist ideologue, Tan—
two early examples of socially engaged moral reasoning; Penwell (2013) introduces the 
thought and work of Watanabe in a recent conference presentation; DeVido (2009) discusses 
the Vietnamese Buddhist revival from the 1920s to the 1950s, in which Khanh was an active 
participant; Park (1998) identifies Han’s “Buddhism for the masses” (K. minjung pulgyo 民
眾佛教) as both socialist and socially engaged; Main (2012) surveys Takeuchi’s thought and 
social work in the Japanese interwar period; Pittman (2001) describes Taixu as an “ethical 
pietist,” referring to reasoning and activity congruent with social engagement.
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we will only discuss Nhat Hanh in any detail below. The most familiar 
names are, of course, those active in the postwar period. Socially engaged 
Buddhists today are inspired by figures such as A. T. Ariyaratne (b. 1931), 
Sulak Sivaraksa (b. 1933), Zhengyan 證嚴 (b. 1937), Bernie Glassman (b. 
1939), and Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), to name a few.5 Postwar figures 
are overwhelmingly involved in nonviolent activism or charitable work, 
either from outside the state establishment where they campaign for such 
things as peace, political rights, environmentalism, and freedom of religion, 
or in cooperation with the state establishment, organizing to respond to the 
massive human suffering caused by natural disaster and illness.
Our revised definition is an attempt to move away from two problems 
that affect scholarly analyses of this topic, namely the use of “socially 
engaged” as a term of moral praise and one restricted to nonviolent groups 
founded in the postwar period. First, we avoid uses of “socially engaged” 
as a term of moral praise indicating that a group is involved in projects of 
social betterment. Many Buddhist institutions add social projects to their 
primary practices, such as chanting, meditation, and care for the dead, but it 
is misleading to consider these supplementary projects engaged. Moreover, 
because ideas about which projects are good have changed over the course 
of the modern period, to praise a group with this term reveals more about 
the moral presuppositions of the labeler than the structural features of 
the group so labeled. Second, we apply “socially engaged” to groups that 
exhibit an underlying continuity in terms of their specific soteriology and 
moral reasoning regardless of whether they were active in the prewar or 
postwar, whether they are new, autonomous associations or subsections of 
established Buddhist groups. We do so despite the fact that prewar groups 
tend to be more nationalistic and less pacifist than later socially engaged 
Buddhism. Acknowledging this continuity between specific groups with 
opposing ideologies is a crucial preliminary step towards understanding 
what led one engaged group to support the nation and its military, and 
another to support world peace. To simply label the first “bad” and the 
second “good” does not answer this question. But we should say more 
5 See Schober (2005) and Houtman (1999). Houtman mentions the way that some polit­
ical leaders viewed Burmese mental culture as itself a form of engaged Buddhism and out-
lines Aung San Suu Kyi’s views of “active compassion.” Some of the most recent figures 
have an online presence. See, for example, the list provided by Queen (2013, p. 527), the 
website of Bernie Glassman’s Zen Peacemakers (http://zenpeacemakers.org/), or the Interna­
tional Network of Engaged Buddhists (INEB) founded by Sulak Sivaraksa, the Dalai Lama, 
and Thich Nhat Hanh (http://www.inebnetwork.org/) (Rothberg 1993).
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about the nature of this continuity—the shared soteriology and moral 
reasoning which lie at the heart of our analysis.
For us, socially engaged Buddhism does not indicate a specific ideologi-
cal framework or particular relation with the state. Rather, we argue that 
one of its central features is the rejection of the historical and ideological 
aspects of secularization, which relegate authentic religion to a position dis­
tant from political power.6 Movements with a variety of modern ideological 
standpoints and political positions can possess a socially engaged soteri­
ology in which social action is itself liberating. Each socio­political situation 
is complex, however, giving rise to nationalistic social engagement in some 
cases and pacifist engagement in others. Scholars of religion, observing 
the resurgence of religious movements and fundamentalisms around the 
world since the 1970s, began to question the classic secularization thesis, 
which predicted that religion would lose social significance in the process 
of modernization. José Casanova (1994) asserts that a modified version of 
the secularization thesis still applies to contemporary religion in the form 
of three independent processes: (1) the structural differentiation of secular 
spheres such as politics, economy, and science from the religious sphere; 
(2) the overall decline of religious practices and beliefs; and (3) the privati-
zation of religion. Secularization is, for us, the exercise of power on the part 
of secular polities to distinguish between the secular and religious in ways 
that undermine the resources and moral legitimacy of religious actors within 
the secular—whether this exercise results in a modest relegation of religion 
to the realm of civil society (apart from the state but still tolerated in the 
public sphere and public sector), or whether it results in a bold relegation of 
religion to the private sphere (where any public manifestation of religious 
activity is subject to suppression). Socially engaged Buddhism is the mirror 
image of secularization, and will view social action within the “secular,” as 
it is structured by a given polity, to be essentially religious and fundamental 
to awakening. And, interestingly, it will view action within the “religious,” 
as structured by a given polity, to be non-essential.7
6 Although they take approaches different from our own, others are beginning to intervene 
in the field of socially engaged Buddhism. Soucy (2014), in a recent conference presentation, 
explains the idea of “exteriority” while Temprano (2012, 2014) reconsiders the positions of 
scholars with respect to questions of authenticity.
7 We hold that any view which gives primacy to interior practice is different from social 
engagement. Although S. B. King (2013, p. 166) critiques the view that one must become 
enlightened oneself before one seeks to help others, she does not pursue this critique in other 
cases. For example, she describes (2013, pp. 164–65) as “engaged” views in which social 
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We argue that Buddhist social engagement is a modern phenomenon that 
relies on a particular form of moral reasoning, one which resonates with 
some of the axioms of liberation theology;8 this reasoning depicts society 
as fundamentally unjust and in need of change, social ills as systemic and in 
need of systematic solutions, social activity itself as Buddhist practice,9 and 
positions religious moral action within the putatively “secular” sphere of the 
modern nation­state. We classify social engagement as one kind of Buddhist 
modernity10 in which Buddhist soteriology is explicitly connected to social 
action, such “that working for social betterment in and of itself constitutes an 
essential part of Buddhist practice.”11 To put this definition in plain language, 
for socially engaged Buddhists, there can be no authentic Buddhism without 
ethical action that continuously attempts to change the nature of society.
The essays contained in this issue provide examples of this socially 
engaged moral reasoning. Goldberg, in his discussion of contemporary 
action follows naturally upon meditative achievement, where we would not. The particular 
reasoning of social engagement prioritizes social action, leaving interior practice in a variety 
of relations with it (identical, consequent, contingent, supporting, or even unnecessary). In 
Sivaraksa’s words: “But meditation alone is not sufficient—because people suffer so much. 
One must also act; one must do what one can” (Rothberg 1993). Action is essential.
8 Especially in the way that liberation theology sees oppression and inequality in society, 
and seeks to proclaim god “in a world that is inhumane” (quoting Gustavo Gutiérrez, Row-
land 2007, p. 3); one labors as a form of religious practice to change that inhumane world, 
and views the state of society and the achievement of religious goals as inseparable (Chaouch 
2012). See also Queen’s (1996b) discussion of B. R. Ambedkar’s presentation of Buddhism 
as a “hermeneutics of liberation.”
9 S. B. King (2013, p. 167) discusses this understanding of social work as inseparable from 
awakening practice, including a quote from the Ariyaratne’s Sarvodaya Sramadana: “we build 
the road and the road builds us.” See S. B. King (2005, pp. 39–41) for further discussion of 
“self-transformation through work” with reference to both Sarvodaya and Ciji. 
10 To suggest that social engagement is one type of Buddhist modernity, of course, is to 
open up the question of other types. Buddhism as a “spirituality” or private practice flour-
ishes within the limitations imposed upon religion by secularism, and can be seen as another 
type. The “mindfulness movement,” in which Buddhism exists as a scientifically verifiable 
“technique” shorn of its religious and institutional overtones, can be seen as yet another (see 
Wilson 2014). McMahan’s (2008) book provides a lucid overview of Buddhist modernism.
11 Stone 2003, p. 66. For descriptions of socially engaged Buddhism as comprising new 
movements, with new institutional structures and charismatic leadership, see Queen (1996a, 
pp. 1–2, 6). It is not surprising that movements within established Buddhist institutions will 
not look to a new charismatic leader, but back to the original founder. Thus, a substitute for 
living charismatic leadership is found in the retelling of founder stories, where stories of 
Nichiren or Dōgen, for example, provide the same unifying and inspiring example as stories 
of Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, Zhengyan, or Sulak Sivaraksa.
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socially engaged pilgrimage to Bodhgayā, describes the sense among 
socially engaged pilgrims that Bihari society is unjust and in desperate need 
of change to address poverty, corruption, caste-based conflict, and “the 
notorious failures of the Bihari government, to provide adequate education, 
food, medicine, clothing, and in some cases shelter.”12 Hakamata, in his work 
to reduce suicide, clearly views society-with-suicide as unjust.13 He gestures 
towards an ideal society14 with that injustice removed, in part, by Buddhist 
social work. This ideal society is, in some fundamental sense, a Buddhist 
society. Both, too, reveal a diagnosis of social ills as systemic and in need 
of systematic solutions. Hakamata, for example, describes “isolation” as the 
“illness of modern society” that leads to suicide, a systemic phenomenon 
caused by the progress of capitalism and rural depopulation. Goldberg 
describes the view that “enlightened education” provided by Buddhist 
schools “will transform society at its roots.”15 In terms of viewing social 
activity as itself Buddhist practice, Goldberg’s pilgrims view the programs 
such as “primary and secondary schools, meditation retreats, health clinics, 
self-help groups, micro-lending schemes, and vocational training centers” 
as “essential for personal, social, and spiritual transformation.”16 Indeed, in 
one view, the Buddhist doctrine of no-self might only be realized fully in 
the form of social action because these activities enable “direct, embodied, 
and experiential understanding.”17 And last, in terms of continuous efforts 
to change society, Ji quotes Taixu’s ideal of a Buddhism that “tries to reform 
society, so as to bring progress to humankind and advance the world.”18
We seek to build upon the excellent work of the contributors to this issue, 
and the ongoing work of scholars such as Sallie B. King and Christopher 
Queen, but recommend modified criteria. What is similar among “socially 
12 See Goldberg’s article, p. 96, below.
13 When socially engaged Buddhists address the environment, too, their rhetoric shifts the 
emphasis to the effect of human society on the world around us, using the language of “pol­
luting,” “harmful,” and “unsustainable” rather than “unjust.”
14 Hakamata describes the ideal society—one without suicide—in the section “The Effect 
of Structural Change on Local Culture” (pp. 86–90, below). Like Ariyaratne’s Sarvodaya 
Sramadana, Hakamata’s ideal society is entangled with a romantic vision of premodern, 
precapitalist village society. For Hakamata, the ideal village enjoys bonds of solidarity, trust, 
mutual work and care, and moderation of desire. It would be worth investigating the extent 
of romantic and pastoral longings in socially engaged moral reasoning, especially in the case 
of groups that focus on rural, environmental, and development issues.
15 Goldberg, p. 106, below.
16 Ibid., p. 96.
17 Ibid., p. 100.
18 Ji, p. 36, below.
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engaged” groups is not a particular political position, form of activism, or 
type of leadership or organization (as S. B. King, Queen, and Ji would assert), 
but a form of moral reasoning, soteriology, and resistance to secularism—
that is, resistance to the modern tendency to restrict religion to the private 
sphere, even to the point of constraining religion to the interior experience of 
individuals. As mentioned above, this allows social engagement to be found 
in certain prewar Buddhist groups, and in some which collaborated closely 
with the nation-state. The prewar Chinese reformer Taixu, for example, 
is not normally himself labeled an “engaged Buddhist” despite having a 
key influence on Vietnamese, Korean, and Taiwanese engaged Buddhist 
groups—especially on Nhat Hanh. Postwar groups differ from Taixu in that 
they possess a nearly universal nonviolent and pacifist orientation, and are 
connected with postwar global peace movements. Although Taixu and other 
Chinese monk­reformers stressed the idea of world peace, they cannot be 
called pacifists. They were similar to postwar movements, however, in the 
moral reasoning embodied in the language of “humanistic Buddhism,” and 
all have been, or desired to be, active in the secular sphere of the nation-
state. Ji’s essay in this issue has great value in that it grapples with the ques-
tion of Taixu’s engagement and analyzes the structural features of how he, 
Nhat Hanh, and others position their institutions and social activities vis-à-
vis the nation-state.
Our definition of social engagement departs from previous scholarship 
insofar as we argue that an analytical definition should be detached from 
particular forms of ethical action, such as charity, and from specific ideolog-
ical commitments, such as pacifism. Instead, it should be understood as the 
performance of action—typically collective or group action—in the public 
and often political sectors of the modern nation­state. Socially engaged 
Buddhists are marked by their view of these spheres of society as legitimate 
and natural locations for Buddhist action, itself seen as morally good and 
of benefit to society as a whole. What distinguishes these groups, then, is 
precisely their resistance (sometimes unconscious) to the aggressive attempt 
of secularism and the secular state to restrict religion to the private sphere. 
Further, we argue that the category should not apply to all socially “active” 
groups. In other words, performing relief work or charity should not,19 in 
19 In fact, some socially engaged rhetoric will offer a critique of charity. S. B. King (2013, p. 
164) explains that the condescension inherent in charity is ameliorated by understanding the 
doctrine of no-self: there is no giver; there is no receiver. In this kind of rhetoric, charitable 
giving must be performed from a Buddhist standpoint in order to avoid its hierarchical and 
oppressive nature.
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the absence of additional criteria, define a group as socially engaged. This 
is because Buddhist altruism relies on a different and less specialized form 
of moral reasoning—even if the concrete provision of food, clothing, and 
shelter in both altruism and social engagement happens to be the same.20 
“Benefitting the other” is the same in both, but social engagement limits 
the locations, methods, and overarching narrative for this other-benefitting 
action. A focus on moral reasoning delimits the category to those groups that 
view social action performed within the secular sphere as the indispensable 
form of religious practice. And moreover, a focus on the way in which 
socially engaged Buddhism counters secularist ideologies, expands the cate-
gory to include a larger range of Buddhist groups—from those earlier in the 
twentieth century to sub­groups found within older, established Buddhist 
institutions. This revised definition allows scholars to see the closest cousins 
of this historically recent national and transnational movement, not in exam-
ples of premodern altruism, but in the Buddhist modernist, revivalist, and 
nationalist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.21
To illustrate a few features of our revised definition, we will take a closer 
look at the early writings of the Vietnamese monk, Thich Nhat Hanh, to 
highlight the ways that he embodies the continuity between prewar and 
postwar socially engaged Buddhism. Next, as an example of resistance to 
secularism typical of socially engaged Buddhism, we discuss the political 
struggles of the Chinese reformer, Taixu, and Chinese student-monks active 
during the first half of the twentieth century. These actors attempted to cre-
ate the conditions for, and to legitimate, Buddhist social action. And, as an 
example of moral reasoning typical of socially engaged Buddhism, we turn 
to the proposals for social work within the Ōtani-ha Shin Buddhist admin-
istration by the Japanese priest, Takeuchi Ryō’on, who was active from 
the 1920s to the 1960s. Takeuchi’s thought demonstrates the way that this 
reasoning differs from basic altruism. Lastly, to bring our discussion up to 
20 See Huang’s discussion of how the generalized idea of Buddhist monetary giving and its 
associated practices relate to the more specific and directed fundraising of the Ciji Founda-
tion; see Goldberg’s assertion, following Queen, that engagement is different from altruism (p. 
98, below). Although Goldberg distinguishes social engagement and altruism at the analytical 
level, he describes the way that pilgrims imagine their social action changes society through 
common schema and concepts from Buddhist ethics (p. 97, below). In his field studies, too, 
the more specific forms of engaged action rely on generalized Buddhist ideas of altruism and 
ethical action.
21 Ji, too, sees engaged Buddhism not as a result of 1960s anti-war movements but as rooted 
in prewar Buddhist reform movements (p. 35, n. 1, below).
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the present day, we introduce in more detail the essays contained in this 
issue by Ji on the career of Zhao Puchu 趙朴初 (1907–2000) in the People’s 
Republic of China, Huang on the nature of transnational Ciji 慈濟 networks 
in Malaysia and the United States during the 1990s and early 2000s, Watt’s 
introduction and translation of Hakamata on a socially engaged Buddhist 
response to the problem of suicide in contemporary Japan, and Goldberg on 
foreign pilgrims to Bodhgayā in contemporary India.
Current Scholarly Definitions of Social Engagement
In the last decades of the twentieth century, scholar-activists and others22 
working on Buddhist ethics began to pay close attention to the social 
activities of modern Buddhist individuals and groups. The challenge for 
scholars was—and remains—to devise a model that clearly links these 
“otherwise independent, globally dispersed movements.”23 Queen defines 
socially engaged Buddhism as “the rise of political activism and social 
service by Buddhist communities and organizations in Asia and the West 
since the 1950s,”24 a “relatively new” movement that stresses “nonviolent 
activism.”25 In his view, this Buddhism is applied to society in ways that 
are nonviolent, progressive, and critical of power. This Buddhism involves 
the reinterpretation of teachings and practices in novel ways.26 Additionally, 
he asserts that engaged Buddhist organizations themselves tend to be new, 
grassroots groups that do not conform to older sectarian boundaries and 
which are often founded, led, or inspired by charismatic leaders.27
22 Although they were not the first scholars to take up the term, Sallie B. King and 
Chris topher Queen forged the academic study of socially engaged Buddhism. They have 
numerous publications, including key edited volumes (Queen and S. B. King 1996; Queen 
2000; Queen, Prebish, and Keown 2003), and S. B. King’s recent monographs (2005, 2009). 
Queen’s argument has developed over time and he recently identifies the reinterpretation of 
Buddhist ideas and practices according to a “collective or social perspective” to be a core 
component of socially engaged Buddhism (Queen 2013, p. 531). We agree and seek to build 
upon his insight, seeing this perspective on social problems and systematic solutions to be 
characteristic.
23 Queen 2013, p. 525.
24 Queen 2005, p. 2785.
25 Queen 2004, p. 248.
26 See, for example, Goldberg’s discussion of novel deployments of the divine abodes (Skt. 
brahma-vihāra) by socially engaged pilgrims (pp. 110–11, below).
27 The study of engaged Buddhism itself is relatively new, with the majority of publications 
appearing after 1990 (Eppsteiner 1988; Kraft 1992; W. L. King 1994; Queen and S. B. King 
1996; Tanaka and Nasu 1998; Strain 1998; Queen 2000; S. B. King 2000; Queen, Prebish, 
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There are two ideological features that most scholarship of socially 
engaged Buddhism insists upon: (1) nonviolence and (2) independence from 
the nation-state. Queen (2003), for example, dismisses Buddhist projects 
associated with the nation­state and S. B. King (2009) insists on non­
violence as the key feature. Here, socially engaged groups are closer to “the 
people” than to “the state” and are, at most, critics of state action. Indeed, 
according to these scholars, engaged Buddhists are supposed to be suspi­
cious of the nation-state, especially when that state is involved in the use of 
force; they view all other Buddhist forms as merely co-opted by the state.28 
In his essay, Ji contemplates precisely this dividing line between criticism 
and co­optation, and concludes that although Zhao speaks the language of 
social engagement, he is “a collaborationist” and cannot be considered an 
engaged Buddhist.29 There is little discussion of older groups displaying 
social engagement, such as the established (Jp. kisei 既成) Buddhist schools 
and sects in Japan—an oversight which Ranjana Mukhopadhyaya (2005), 
Stephen Covell (2005), and John Nelson (2013) have begun to address.30
Towards the “Analytical”; Away from the “Moral”
Because it is considered good to be concerned with society and actively 
involved in its improvement, “social engagement” is often used to signify 
the general claim that Buddhism influences the world in morally good ways, 
or to indicate a Buddhist group’s active involvement in contemporary social 
issues. It is crucial to assert that we do not use it as a term of moral praise 
in either sense. Instead, we explore the term as an analytical category for 
and Keown 2003; Queen 2003; S. B. King 2005; Queen 2005; Rothberg 2006; S. B. King 
2009; Ip 2009a and 2009b). See also the bibliographies compiled by Rothberg (2004) and 
Queen (2005). In Japanese, see the work of Ama (2003) and Mukhopadhyaya (2005).
28 Juliane Schober, for example, divides Burmese Buddhism into two halves. One is “the 
nationalist, centralized, and ritualistic patronage of Buddhism” by the state which uses 
“large­scale rituals to legitimate a political hierarchy of the state,” and the other is “the 
socially engaged Buddhism advocated by Aung San Suu Kyi that emphasized personal, 
social engagement, ethics,” and meditation, and resists “spiritual and material exploitation 
by the state” (Schober 2005, pp. 113–14; emphasis added).
29 Ji, pp. 38, 42, below.
30 There are still few theoretical models of engaged Buddhism in Japan. Mukhopadhyaya 
(2005) proposes a four­fold typology of nationalization, socialization, popularization, 
and internationalization into which she places groups that span the twentieth century and 
into the twenty-first. Her typology is especially important for scholars examining social 
engagement because it allows her to link postwar groups to prewar ones, showing the ways 
that engagement has shifted over time. See also John Nelson’s (2013) recent work.
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use by scholars of modern Buddhism. An analytical category has as its goal, 
not the identification of the authentic or the moral, but the explanation of 
significant trends within the broad phenomena of modern Buddhism.31 A 
good category will answer questions about the nature and structure of social 
movements and how they change over time. Specifically, our category is 
crafted to explain how it is that—despite deeply conflicting ideologies—
certain nationalist and anti­establishment Buddhist forms in the twentieth 
century are so similar to one another in activity and rhetoric.
The frequent use of “socially engaged” as a label of moral praise and 
authenticity, however, alerts us to the delicate set of issues that impinge 
on the values of living Buddhists. There is a careful balance to be struck 
between what religious actors and groups claim about themselves, and the 
analytical categories that scholars apply to them.32 Neither should be sub­
ordinated to the other. So, how should scholars understand concerns about 
authenticity and originality that constantly appear in debates over whether 
socially engaged Buddhism is old or new?33 In this essay, although we 
privilege the analytical approach, we understand claims of authenticity 
and originality made for socially engaged Buddhism as “embedded”: an 
embedded argument is meant to have rhetorical force, to persuade others. 
They are effective rhetorical and motivational strategies necessary to estab-
lish cohesion and identity for engaged Buddhist groups, and are prompted 
by the position of religion in modernity. That is, these claims are deeply 
woven into the very existence of socially engaged groups.
Because modernity projects religion backwards in time, modern Bud­
dhist embedded arguments will always look back to premodern sources of 
31 Although Bodhi (2009) remains concerned with authenticity in his category of the 
post modern, his definition of social engagement is close to our own in several important 
ways. Distinguishing social engagement from other types of Buddhism, he stresses not the 
attempt to change or affect society (which is shared by many types), but the “appli cation” of 
Buddhism in the modern historical context to instigate “systemic changes in social, political, 
and economic institutions” (Bodhi 2009, p. 2). For Bodhi, this represents a shift in Buddhist 
goals away from internal cultivation to the external knowledge and technique necessary to 
change sys tems and institutions (2009, pp. 3, 15).
32 Birnbaum (2009, p. 26), for example, chooses to avoid declaring an “authentic” socially 
engaged Buddhism in deference to living Buddhist social actors, and pursues instead a model 
of social engagement “contained in a core set of Mahayana sutras.”
33 This continual appearance of the “old” versus “new” debate bears much in common with 
another dichotomy spawned by modernity, “traditional” versus “modern.” See Yarnall’s use 
of the dichotomy of “traditionist” and “modernist” to examine socially engaged Buddhism 
(Yarnall 2003), and Temprano’s (2012) critique.
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authenticity for rhetorical force—and thus new things will always be por-
trayed as old. It is a maneuver integral to prescriptive arguments found 
within modern religious traditions and among their practitioners, although 
it is by no means exclusive to them. Engaged Buddhists must portray what 
is an innovative approach to practice, not as innovative, but as original. 
What is this innovative approach? It is one in which the modern tech-
niques of social and political action are defined as Buddhist practices with 
soteriological value. This means that charitable work or anti-war activism 
is socially engaged when that activism itself directly expresses the highest 
goals of Buddhism as a religion. Because engaged groups incorporate mod­
ern social and charitable work as practice, they must make two claims. 
First, they must claim that these novel activities are both authentic and 
venerable. This normally appears in arguments that Buddhism has been 
engaged with society from its very beginning34—often portraying the Bud-
dha himself as engaged—either in intent or actuality. Second, they must 
distinguish themselves from other Buddhist movements that do not share 
their innovative approach to practice. Most often this is accomplished via a 
historical claim that Buddhist engagement has been suppressed by internal 
corruption or external oppression, and thus engagement must be found 
anew through reform and increased social activity.35 Thich Nhat Hanh uses 
both of these strategies in his 1967 work, Vietnam: The Lotus in the Sea of 
Fire, to which we turn here.
Thich Nhat Hanh’ s Early Vision of Social Engagement
One particular Buddhist, the Vietnamese monk and activist Thich Nhat Hanh, 
has been the prototypical socially engaged Buddhist in the eyes of both activ-
ists and scholars. In fact, most scholarly introductions begin with Nhat Hanh, 
the 1960s, and the war in Vietnam,36 or with the 1963 self­immolation of one 
of his contemporaries, Thich Quang Duc (1897–1963).37 Nhat Hanh can be 
seen—as Queen does—as a champion of nonviolence, as applying Buddhist 
teachings to global society in novel ways, and as a charismatic leader who 
34 See Ji on Zhao’s claim that Renjian Buddhism was “already present in early Buddhism” 
(p. 42, below).
35 Goldberg reports that “many engaged pilgrims and local activists” are critical of using 
funds to build Buddhist memorial sites and temples when these lack a social function (p. 104, n. 
26, below).
36 See also Ji’s contribution to this issue (pp. 35–58, below).
37 Rothberg 2006, p. ix; W. L. King 1994, p. 14; Ama 2003.
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has inspired new groups. Nhat Hanh even intro duced the term “engaged 
Buddhism” into English vernacular discourse during the 1960s. Since then, 
the term has slowly circulated and been taken up by other Buddhist activists 
and organizers.38 Although many aspects of Nhat Hanh’s life, thought, and 
organizational style seem to embody the key features of widely accepted 
current scholarly definitions of social engagement, what is both curious 
and telling is the way that Nhat Hanh’s own view diverges from them. Few 
scholars mention the fact that Nhat Hanh sees himself as continuing an 
earlier movement that began prior to the 1950s or that this earlier movement 
was inspired by the Buddhist reform movement in China and closely tied to 
Vietnamese Buddhist nationalism.39 Fewer still identify the nature of this 
continuity. He refers to the Chinese Buddhist reformer, Taixu, by name, 
identifying him as a source of inspiration for the social reform aspects of 
the Vietnamese Buddhist revival of the 1920s and 1930s.40 It is, in fact, the 
rejection of nationalism in the postwar academy, and the deep geopolitical 
and ideological differences between 1930s Buddhist reviv alism and 
1960s anti-war activism, that obscure what Nhat Hanh sees as an essential 
continuity. A close reading of how Nhat Hanh defines “engaged Buddhism” 
will illustrate this point.
Throughout Lotus in the Sea of Fire, Nhat Hanh makes two arguments 
that we believe are typical of socially engaged rhetoric: he rejects “disen-
gaged” Buddhism, either as a false stereotype or as the result of political 
oppression; and, he posits “engaged” Buddhism as its authentic and original 
form. In other words, he argues that authentic Buddhism is always engaged 
in society.
Nhat Hanh responds to a pervasive and negative view of Buddhism as 
“detached” from society (or “in the mountain,” to use his words). Buddhism 
has been criticized in many ways over its long history, including an endur-
ing view of Buddhist monks as “parasitic” in China, but what is important 
here is the confluence of factors that brought this particular iteration of the 
38 Thich Nhat Hanh 1967. See for example Sulak Sivaraksa’s writings from the late 1980s 
onward. Queen (1996a, p. 34, n. 6) briefly traces the use of the terms “engaged” and “socially 
engaged” in English. Nhat Hanh states that he first proposed the idea of engaged Buddhism 
earlier, in a series of newspaper articles and essays beginning in 1954 (2008a, p. 30). In 
1964, his term for engaged Buddhism was “Buddhism entering into society or social life” (V. 
Dao Phat di vao cuoc doi; 2008a, p. 31).
39 For descriptions of modern Vietnamese Buddhism that trace this earlier movement and its 
impact, see Ji in this issue and DeVido (2007, 2009).
40 Thich Nhat Hanh 1967, p. 50.
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criticism to the forefront of modern public discourse and that compelled a 
response from modern Buddhists attempting to justify social action. This 
view of Buddhism as detached or disengaged was widely held and expressed 
in contemptuous fashion by Christian missionaries, government officials, 
and even by Buddhists themselves. Ji, for example, relates Taixu’s assertion 
that “a modern Buddhism must base itself not on ‘ghosts’ (Ch. gui 鬼) and 
‘death’ (Ch. si 死)—that is to say, ideas of the afterworld and the performance 
of funerary services.”41 In both China and Japan, for instance, monks and 
nuns were seen, and continue to be seen, as parasites who do not contribute 
useful labor to society but instead exploit the people, profiting from irrational 
and expensive rituals and funerary rites.42 They are thought parasitic in the 
modern sense of neglecting civic duty and persisting in unscientific action. 
Buddhism was portrayed by its critics as superstitious, irrational, useless, and 
corrupt.43 Nhat Hanh responds to this critique by arguing that Buddhism 
was disengaged and otherworldly only when it had been deformed by exter-
nal pressures, such as colonialism. If the Vietnamese Buddhism of the early 
twentieth century was moribund, he argues, it was the result of French 
colonial interference and not a state natural to Buddhism itself.44
This negative stereotype of Buddhism is endemic to the modern period. It 
arose as a fusion of Christian, colonial, scientistic, and nationalistic polem­
ics. Moreover, this stereotype has appeared in the political discourse of var-
ious Asian nations. Often, it has been part of an aggressive secularism that 
appropriated the material, moral, and political capital of Buddhist institu­
tions.45 Although there is also a scholarly discourse that paints Buddhism 
as disengaged, apolitical, and “otherworldly” (famously ascribed to Max 
Weber46), we are more interested in the responses of Buddhists to the tangi­
41 Ji, p. 36, below.
42 Covell 2005, Lai 2013, Nedostup 2009.
43 In modern Japan, Buddhists have persistently felt the need to respond to the “funeral Bud-
dhism” critique. In modern China, they strove to respond to the criticism that Buddhism was 
parasitic and idle (see Ji’s essay in this issue). Kraft (1992, p. 3) lists a number of early modern 
and modern criticisms of Buddhism as “disengaged.” We discuss this component of socially 
engaged rhetoric further below.
44 Thich Nhat Hanh 1967.
45 For the early twentieth century deployments of this critique see, for example, Josephson 
(2006) on the anti­Buddhist campaigns and the response of the Japanese Buddhist reformer 
Inoue Enryō 井上円了 (1858–1919); or Duara (1991) on the economy of anti-religion cam-
paigns of Chinese reformers involved with the emergent nation-state.
46 Weber’s view of Buddhism was complex (Gellner 2009, p. 52), but the strawman attrib-
uted to Weber appears constantly in recent works touching on Buddhism and society. Weber 
also famously declares Buddhism to be apolitical in The Religion of India: “Ancient Bud­
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ble political and economic impact of secularism and the way that moder­
nity itself—by projecting religion into an imagined, traditional past—makes 
secularism seem natural. In this latter sense, Buddhists have always had 
to manage the fear of being unsuited to modern society. This is why Taixu 
fiercely rejected Buddhism’s perceived disengagement in the prewar period, 
and why Nhat Hanh argues against it in the postwar period. This fear of 
being unsuited to modernity was keenly felt by Buddhists acting in society, 
and for this reason, became characteristic of Buddhist reform movements 
throughout nineteenth and early twentieth century Asia that justified Buddhist 
social action. By attacking this stereotype, and the very real marginalization 
of Buddhist institutions that it enabled,47 Taixu and Nhat Hanh set the stage 
for replacing this “false” Buddhism with what each viewed as its authentic 
version. For Nhat Hanh, authentic Buddhism is legitimately enmeshed in 
society and ought to retain or even expand its institutional capital—precisely 
because its effect on society would be morally desirable.
Nhat Hanh argues that, far from being otherworldly, Buddhism has always 
been engaged in social action:48
So the Buddha is not in the mountain. He is considered to be in 
everyone, so that the peace and well-being of the whole people 
require that every Buddhist should fulfill his responsibility to the 
community while not neglecting his inner life.49
Here we have a new paradigm for action—performing social service as Bud-
dhist practice—which is portrayed as authentic and original, thus always 
there. In our view, responses like Nhat Hanh’s are “engaged” when they 
attempt to preserve society as a legitimate sphere of action for Buddhists, 
often by claiming that such action is quintessentially Buddhist. Nhat Hanh 
dhism represents in almost all, practically decisive points the characteristic polar opposite 
of Confucianism as well as of Islam. It is a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status 
religion, more precisely, a religious ‘technology’ of wandering and of intellectually­schooled 
mendicant monks. Like all Indian philosophy and theology it is a ‘salvation religion,’ if one 
is to use the name ‘religion’ for an ethical movement without a deity and without a cult” 
(Weber [1916] 1958, p. 206).
47 It is important to note that Buddhism’s sense of itself as embattled did not mean that 
among religious groups it suffered the most. Chinese popular religious sites, for example, were 
confiscated to a much larger degree. For more on this Chinese Buddhist self-image in the early 
twentieth century, see Lai 2013.
48 Jones (2012), in his overview of socially engaged Buddhism, presents the same argument 
as Nhat Hanh; he points out that Buddhism is falsely seen as withdrawn from the world, but, in 
truth, it has always been engaged.
49 Thich Nhat Hanh 1967, p. 18.
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argues that active concern for suffering in the world is the natural expression 
of Buddhist cultivation.50 He explains that the modern form of this natural 
expression is found in the Buddhist activities to alleviate suffering and deve-
lop society that emerged during the revival of Vietnamese Buddhism in the 
1930s—part anti-colonial enterprise and part inspiration by the “renovation 
of Buddhism in China led by the great Chinese monk Thai-Hu [Taixu].”51 In 
both China and Vietnam, the revival consisted of new, modern study groups 
and associations, with their own recognizably modern periodicals and pam­
phlets (different from the treatises and commentaries of the Buddhist past). 
It also included a youth movement heavily involved in education and social 
welfare.52
The very first time Nhat Hanh uses the term “engaged Buddhism,” it is 
with reference to the prewar revival. He clearly sees his activities in the 
1960s as a continuation of this revival: “In the 1930s the Buddhist scholars 
had already discussed the engagement of Buddhism in the modern society 
and called it nhan gian Phat Giao53 or ‘engaged Buddhism.’ ”54 Further, 
Nhat Hanh links this prewar engaged Buddhism with formations and behav-
iors that, according to Queen and S. B. King, it is not supposed to exhibit, 
such as nationalism and political involvement. He notes the close ties of the 
prewar Buddhist revival with Vietnamese nationalism,55 and describes the 
establishment of the Unified Buddhist Church in relation to political events, 
following on the fall of the Diem regime in the 1960s. Lastly, he highlights 
the continued efforts of youth groups56 in Saigon to “ ‘actualize’ (V. hien dai 
hoa) Buddhism” and how they mobilized “the potential force of their reli­
gion to rebuild their society and consequently have carried Buddhism into 
every domain of life: culture, economics, politics, social welfare.”57 The 
50 Thich Nhat Hanh 1967, pp. 9–11, 18.
51 Thich Nhat Hanh 1967, p. 50. See DeVido (2007, 2009) for further discussion of how 
Taixu influenced the Vietnamese Buddhist revival and Thich Nhat Hanh’s conception of 
engaged Buddhism.
52 In 1964, continuing earlier youth initiatives, Nhat Hanh set up the School of Youth for 
Social Service, which trained lay and monastic youth as social workers, dispatching them to 
help rebuild rural villages, educate children, set up dispensaries and cooperatives, and so on 
(Thich Nhat Hanh 2008a, p. 35).
53 A translation of “Buddhism for the human [world]” (Ch. renjian fojiao 人間佛教).
54 Thich Nhat Hanh 1967, p. 52.
55 Ibid., pp. 52, 56.
56 Through a “School of Youth for Social Service” at the newly founded (1964) Van Hanh 
University (Ibid., p. 58).
57 Ibid., p. 56.
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Vietnamese term that Nhat Hanh translates as “actualize” literally means “to 
modernize.” This general idea can be compared to the desire to “Buddhicize” 
(Ch. fohua 佛化) one’s society and the whole world, which was extremely 
popular among Chinese Buddhist reformers in the early twentieth century.58 
Nhat Hanh’s support of this goal to remake society using Buddhism, a goal 
commonly held by socially engaged leaders, is strongly anti­secularist. This 
is not Buddhism as a private, spiritual practice; this is Buddhism deliberately 
performed throughout all spheres of society.
It is only in the later part of what Nhat Hanh views as a continuous 
development that the particular constellation of ideological features which 
scholars consider characteristic of socially engaged Buddhism as a whole 
appeared: In a post-World War II context of civil war and regime change 
in 1960s Vietnam, it became socially progressive, apolitical, anti-war, 
and non violent.59 Moreover, it became postcolonial, globally-minded, 
ecumenical, and critical of ruling establishments. What this set of features 
excludes is the revivalist and nationalist Vietnamese Buddhism of the 
1930s60 with its goal of recreating society—the period when, according to 
Nhat Hanh, the term “engaged” was first being used.
Whether they were conservative, nationalist, anti-establishment, or paci-
fist, these prewar and postwar movements have more in common with each 
other than they do with any example of premodern Buddhist altruism. For 
Nhat Hanh writing in 1967, the prewar and postwar movements are both 
“engaged.” Like Nhat Hanh, we see no obstacle to considering as “socially 
engaged” Buddhist movements that are revivalist, nationalistic, or socialist, 
if they specifically focus on social action within society as the primary form 
of religious practice. For Nhat Hanh, it is not nonviolence per se that is the 
key feature of engagement (although there is no question that it is absolutely 
58 Lai 2013.
59 S. B. King (2009, chapter 4) takes nonviolence as a core characteristic, and discusses the 
pervasive influence of Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948): “It should be very clear that groups 
and individuals who violate the norm of nonviolent words and deeds cannot be considered to 
be Engaged Buddhists” (S. B. King 2009, p. 26).
60 There are other examples viewed as somewhat socially engaged but often with ambiva-
lence or criticism: early and mid-twentieth century Buddhist activist Walpola Rahula 
(1907–1997) argued strongly for monastic participation in politics and society as he viewed 
“service to others” as the essence of Buddhism (Queen and S. B. King 1996, pp. 14–17). 
He contributed as well to the growth of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism and is criticized 
by Tambiah (1992, pp. 18–30) and Queen (1996a, p. 19). B. R. Ambedkar, as well, was 
supportive of military service during World War II (Fitzgerald 1999, pp. 89–90). Taixu was 
said to support military service for monks (Yu 2005, chapter 4), and so on.
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central to the Buddhism he espouses), but rather the programmatic efforts 
to remake and reform every aspect of society.
Criteria for Inclusion: Anti-secular and Active in Public Life
In the next two sections, we present a few examples from our research on 
modern Buddhism in China and Japan to further illustrate the key features 
of our definition of socially engaged Buddhism.
In our first example, we discuss the way Chinese reformers and student-
monks worked to create better citizens, support the nation and defend it 
when necessary, teach dharma to prisoners, care for orphans, and minister to 
other disadvantaged social groups.61 These Chinese Buddhists in the early 
twentieth century shared, according to our redefinition of Buddhist social 
engagement, a moral reasoning, soteriology, and resistance to secularism 
common among engaged Buddhists in both the pre­ and postwar periods. In 
the case of China, however, secularization did not lead to the “privatization” 
of Buddhism, but to its regulation and institutionalization. In order to 
assert themselves as active participants in a project they deemed not only 
beneficial but necessary for the survival of both Buddhism and the nation, 
Chinese reformist Buddhists had to first fight for entry into the public sphere, 
against the opposition of the state and regulated Buddhist institutions.
Lai argues that the student­monks, whose identities were produced by 
a newly modernized Buddhist education system, can be seen as “engaged 
citizens.”62 When we focus on social action as religious practice in the secu­
lar sphere (which meant both the public and political spheres of the modern 
Chinese nation-state), and when we avoid categorization based on specific 
political or ideological commitments, these student­monks and reformers 
can be considered socially engaged Buddhists. In fact, the groups that can 
be included are surprisingly diverse and display a range of orientations 
to the nation-state: from explicitly political, even nationalist, to explicitly 
apolitical. The important element is that these orientations are enabling of 
specific secular actions. Expressing political commitments enables Bud-
dhist groups to participate in the secular sphere of the nation-state—or to 
critique it. In order to protect the ability of Chinese Buddhists to act in the 
secular sphere, for example, a struggle to control property and gain legal 
and political rights was required. In other cases, avoiding political com-
61 Pitman 2001, pp. 102–4; Lai 2013; Yu 2005.
62 Lai 2013.
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mitments and legal struggles enables Buddhist groups to cross national 
boundaries and act transnationally—as in the case of the postwar Ciji.63 But 
in all cases, these groups are “engaged” because they do not acknowledge a 
boundary between their religious lives and secular action.
Talal Asad argues that “secularization” does not describe a universal 
or natural process, but one in which the very notion of the secular itself 
emerged from the specific geographical and historical contexts of modern 
Western Europe.64 Where, then, does that leave the nation-states of Asia? 
According to Asad, the “secular” was already embedded in the ideolog ical 
framework that was transmitted to the non­Western world as a result of 
colonization. As a political ideology in Asia, then, religion and the secular 
have been mutually constitutive. This last point is especially rele vant to 
our understanding of modern China where “religion” became an indis­
pensable space in the formation of the modern nation­state. In China, the 
differentiation of the religious from the secular sphere required the inven-
tion of “religion” as a political category. Secularization at the dawn of the 
twentieth century in China can be seen as a “dual movement of distinction 
and intervention,”65 in which “religion” (zongjiao 宗教) and “superstition” 
(mixin 迷信) as legitimate categories in political discourse were created, 
a move which had serious repercussions for political as well as religious 
life.66 For those Buddhists who promoted social engagement, this required 
entry into this movement of secularization, marked by continuous tension 
and negotiation between state and religious actors.
63 One of the most interesting apolitical groups that many recognize as socially engaged is 
Ciji (or Tzu Chi) which has an explicit commitment to remain politically neutral. All mem-
bers, in fact, take a precept to refrain from political participation, including civil disobedi-
ence: “Do not participate in politics or demonstrations” (Tzu Chi USA Website, http://www 
.us.tzuchi.org/; Huang 2009, p. 75). In one well-known symbolic example, Ye Jinchuan 葉金
川, Taiwan’s former Minister of Health and Ciji member of long standing, publically declared 
that he stopped wearing his Ciji tie when he became a politician because Ciji “does not 
participate in politics” (http://news.cts.com.tw/udn/international/200908/200908040297158 
.html). For more information about the social and public-sector activities of the Ciji, see 
Laliberté 2004 and Huang 2009.
64 Asad 1993, 2003.
65 Szonyi 2009, p. 317. The recent works of Ashiwa and Wank (2009), Goossaert and 
Palmer (2011), Ji (2008), and Nedostup (2009) mark an important step towards a more 
nuanced understanding of secularization as it applies to China.
66 Ashiwa 2009, Duara 1995, Nedostup 2009. See also Josephson (2012) who outlines a 
similar process for the Japanese nation­state.
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The state had to first distinguish religion from superstition before attempt-
ing to reconstitute and regulate religious life; its aim was to make religion 
beneficial to the nation-building project.67 According to this top­down model, 
a religion ought to be purely a spiritual and ethical tradition, well­organized 
under its respective national association, and useful to the modernization 
project of the state.68 This caused socially engaged Buddhist leaders such 
as Taixu to advocate a “Humanistic Buddhism” which went against the idea 
that religion ought to be purely a spiritual tradition. Yet, this “Humanistic 
Buddhism” was formulated in such a way that allowed it to be cooperative 
and supportive of the state’s modernization and so enter and act in the secular 
sphere.
Taixu is well known for his contribution to the modernization of Chinese 
Buddhism, but it is also important to note here the ways that he rejected sec­
ularism. In a perfect example of how explicitly political action can display 
the characteristics of social engagement, Lai describes the fight for political 
rights by Taixu and his Chinese student-monks in the 1930s and 1940s.69 
Taixu, as mentioned above, rejected the idea of the otherworldly monk, 
and described the authentic Buddhist monk as both socially and politically 
involved. He and his students’ struggle was to protect the institutional and 
economic capital of Buddhism via political representation. He encouraged 
monks and nuns to vote, to be aware of current events, and even to run for 
office (although he later abandoned this proposal under tremendous pres-
sure from other, especially lay, Buddhists).70 The end goal was to achieve a 
Buddhism that performs good action and serves the people. In fact, political 
action itself was considered a form of public service proper to monks.
In her study of the emergence and impact of modern educational institu­
tions in Chinese Buddhism, Lai argues that the “student-monk” served as an 
ideal image of the modern monastic career for China’s young and progres­
sive monks in the twentieth century. According to this ideal, student-monks 
were educated in both religious and secular knowledge, had a rational and 
“scientific” approach to religion, were sensitive to contemporary issues in 
Chinese society, and shared a vision for modern China in which Buddhism 
67 The model for this reconfiguration was pragmatic, although heavily influenced by Chris-
tianity (Goossaert and Palmer 2011).
68 Ibid., p. 58.
69 Lai 2013.
70 Pittman 2001, p. 189. Taixu originally proposed the establishment of a Buddhist politi-
cal party. He founded the journal, Juequn zhoubao 覺群週報, in 1946 to promote that idea (Lai 
2013, p. 232).
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would play an active role in society. In addition, student-monks in the early 
twentieth century were both nationalistic and revivalist. They appropriated 
not only nationalist discourses in justifying a more engaged role in secular 
matters, but also the symbolic authority of leading reformist monks, such as 
Taixu, to legitimate their movement.
Their modernization project aimed not only at ensuring the survival of 
Buddhism, but also at negotiating a place for Buddhism vis-à-vis the state 
in the newly founded republic. In fact, the Buddhist response to the state’s 
changing attitude and policies towards religion during this period can be 
seen as a typical example of resistance to secularism. In emphasizing the 
vital role of Buddhism in the nation’s pursuit of public morality, for exam-
ple, the monk Renshan 仁山 (1887–1951) insisted on the Buddhist ideal 
of compassion. He argued that although China needed to educate its peo­
ple in citizenship in order to realize republicanism, the rise of citizenship 
would not be possible unless the Buddhist ideal of compassion flourished 
among the people.71 Here we see that Renshan did not hesitate to appro­
priate national discourse in formulating an engaged Buddhist identity. In 
reconciling their Buddhist identity with that of the nation, Chinese Buddhists 
not only viewed religion as an indispensable component in the formation of 
the nation, but also asserted a national identity deeply rooted in Buddhism.
Survival of their religion aside, these reformers were genuinely con-
vinced that active participation in every aspect of the society was the way 
to perfect their bodhisattva path. In actively seeking equal citizenship, they 
were confronted with the stereotypical notion of the sangha being “out­
side of this world” ( fangwai 方外). One of the intriguing characteristics of 
student­monks’ writing during this period is how skilled they were in both 
the language of modernity and the doctrine of Buddhism. This allowed them 
to formulate a soteriology, utilizing the language and symbols popular­
ized by the state, which was firmly grounded in Mahayana teachings. In 
stressing the importance of the bodhisattva spirit of not abandoning sentient 
beings in this world, and the skilful means to sacrifice one’s own interest 
to accomplish what was beneficial to the welfare of sentient beings, they 
put forward the student-monk as eminently suited to selfless dedication to 
the welfare of all in the nation. Therefore, participation in social welfare, 
politics, and military actions for the defense of the nation during the war 
was subsumed within the duty of a modern-day bodhisattva.72
71 Lai 2013, p. 64.
72 Ibid., pp. 219–23.
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Criteria for Exclusion: Social Action as Buddhist Practice
If any Buddhist group active in the secular sphere, whether in civil society 
or politics, is to be included in the category of socially engaged, then the 
category itself will become vague and unwieldy. To retain its analytical sharp-
ness, then, additional criteria must be introduced. For scholarship of socially 
engaged Buddhism to date, this criterion has been nonviolence. We suggest, 
by contrast, that this criterion be a specific mode of moral reasoning. For a 
group to be socially engaged, it must argue that social, public, or political 
action is Buddhist in nature. This means that not all engaged Buddhists 
are pacifists by definition but that, in terms of history, most of them have 
been pacifist since the end of War World II. Engaged Buddhists can trace 
their influences to the peace movements of the early postwar period and 
globalizing traditions of nonviolent resistance. The historical shift from the 
prewar to postwar period affects certain political ideas within engaged groups, 
but not the underlying resistance to secularism and a description of social 
action itself as Buddhist practice. Here, we present an example of an engaged 
faction within a conservative, established (and, at the time, war-supporting) 
Japanese Buddhist school: the Ōtani-ha branch of Shin Buddhism.
Main argues that the priest Takeuchi Ryō’on, from the Ōtani-ha, was 
an engaged Buddhist typical of his time and context.73 He worked as a 
mid-level priest-bureaucrat within a large, established, and conservative 
sect, and managed that sect’s social engagement. From the 1920s to the 
1950s, Takeuchi developed policies to address contemporary social issues, 
particularly discrimination against burakumin 部落民,74 and created a pro­
gram of social work designed to alleviate what he saw as the causes and 
effects of those issues. In concrete terms, he was involved with a wide vari-
ety of centralized and systematized sectarian programs that brought people 
together for the purposes of outreach, vocational training, education, and pov-
erty alleviation. Takeuchi’s department oversaw everything from early child-
hood education, youth groups, seniors’ groups, womens’ and mens’ groups, 
Sunday schools, lifestyle improvement, vocational training for men and 
women (which included sewing, flower cultivation, and the tea ceremony). 
He organized the training of Shin priests and others as social workers and 
the “settlement­for­life” of temple priests in burakumin communities. The 
Ōtani-ha encouraged and funded the creation of co-operatives, places of 
free lodging, and medical dispensaries. A major focus here for Takeuchi 
73 Main 2012.
74 Ibid.
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was programs for the care and welfare of infants, children, boys and girls, 
women and mothers, and former prisoners. Shin social workers, them­
selves organized in a network, sought to create regional sub-networks to 
aid in improvement activities and, through this network, to aid in dispute 
resolution and mediation.75 In Takeuchi’s view, the Shin Buddhist social 
worker must stand between the vulnerable and those in power and con-
stantly work to create a better society.
In Japanese scholarship, phrases like “society­creating Buddhism” (shakai 
o tsukuru bukkyō 社会を作る仏教) and “socially participating Buddhism” 
(shakai sanka bukkyō 社会参加仏教) are used for social engagement.76 In a 
similar way, Takeuchi referred to Shin Buddhism’s “social meaning” (shakai 
teki igi 社会的意義) and its activities “for the sake of society” (shakai no tame 
社会の為). He exhibited the kind of moral reasoning that we believe to be 
common to socially engaged Buddhists: he argued that “benefitting others” 
(rita 利他) in society was “none other than the goal itself.”77 He asserted that 
modern social work was none other than the “true transmission” (tadashii 
senpu 正しい宣布) of Shin Buddhist teachings,78 and by “transmission of the 
teachings” (kyōgi o senden 教義を宣伝) Takeuchi meant “precisely to sympa­
thize well with the sufferings of people, know them, and create institutions 
(shisetsu 施設) to respond to them.”79 It is not the case for Takeuchi that 
Buddhist practice was somehow separate from social work. “Shin Bud­
dhist social work must be learned in the doing.”80 Using Shin ethical lan­
guage, Takeuchi expressed this learning-by-doing as the Shin ideal of a 
true companion (dōbō 同朋) who acts out of gratitude. The true companion 
of “the poor and oppressed” learns to be a companion “by having that very 
goal ”81 of performing social work for the poor and oppressed. In this way, 
Takeuchi equated Shin social work with the mode of being of the ideal 
Shin practitioner: a life of continuous gratitude. The upshot of his writings 
on social action is that, in the end, authentic, good Shin Buddhists must be 
social workers.
It is important to distinguish this from merely altruistic or other­
benefitting modes of moral reasoning. In addition to the often-encountered 
75 Main 2013, pp. 233–34.
76 Ama 2003, Mukhopadhyaya 2005.
77 Takeuchi 1976, p. 15.
78 Ibid., pp. 264–65.
79 Ibid., p. 17.
80 Ibid., p. 18.
81 Ibid.
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Buddhist critique of the implicit hierarchy between the one who acts 
benevolently and the one who receives benevolence, socially engaged 
reasoning recognizes action as moral only when it changes the nature of 
the social relations and situations that cause the other to experience pain, 
privation, and exclusion. From early in the twentieth century, this has meant 
systematic solutions and broad reform to properly address social problems.
Current definitions of social engagement cannot account for priest-
bureaucrats like Takeuchi Ryō’on. The groups he founded and worked 
within were neither new, nor independent, nor anti­establishment. Ideolog­
ically, too, Takeuchi is difficult to place. He was nationalistic, loyal to the 
emperor, and supported both the war effort82 and national public health 
campaigns of a fascist nature.83 But he was also deeply sympathetic and 
supportive of left-wing, Marxist liberation movements for marginalized 
groups, such as burakumin and Korean residents of Japan. He spoke out 
against systemic discrimination against women and children, and much of 
his moral vision for the Ōtani branch was radically egalitarian. One of his 
followers inside the sect institution, Asano Onchi 朝野温知 (1906–1982, also 
known as Yi Su­ryong 李壽龍), remembers how his appearance confounded 
those who wanted to place him in an ideological box. Takeuchi, “that old 
friend of the buraku liberation movement, tall in stature, hair swept back, a 
wide forehead, and large eyes,” dressed like an old right-wing conservative 
in his worn­out traditional clothing. Yet, according to Asano, on the inside 
Takeuchi was very progressive.84
Takeuchi believed that the Ōtani branch should position itself between 
political ideologies to advance social goals, but not against the ruling estab-
lishment. He believed the sect ought to support the state, as he himself did. 
For him, social problems were a shared, rather than individual, responsibility 
and they required social, systematic solutions. Like other socially engaged 
Buddhists, he developed a critique of individual, charitable or altruistic 
82 Although he considered war a horrible form of human suffering, he supported comfort 
missions to bereaved families, war memorials, mobilization of sect resources for the war 
effort, and colonial migration. Morality, for Takeuchi, was to strive in the midst of corrup-
tion, violence, and human evil—since there could only be greater or lesser degrees of evil, 
never an absence of it.
83 Takeuchi, whose work in the 1930s and early 1940s accorded with state projects to seg­
regate Hansen’s disease sufferers, manage colonial holdings, and support the war is certainly 
vulnerable to critique. In particular, his activities connected to leprosy have been harshly 
criticized since the repeal of laws mandating the quarantine of leprosy patients in 1996.
84 Asano 1988, p. 236.
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action,85 as well as a critique of “disengagement” in the institutional history 
of Buddhism. Takeuchi may have been quirky and driven, but he was not a 
charismatic leader of a new group as such. Charisma was located elsewhere, 
in the founder-exemplar, Shinran, not in the priest-bureaucrat, Takeuchi.
Concluding Remarks: Social Engagement Then and Now
What engaged Buddhists share is a rejection of any delineation of a secular 
sphere that excludes Buddhism, regardless of who attempts to create or 
enforce that sphere. Social action that does not accept a boundary between 
the religious and the secular always takes up a position with respect to the 
nation­state and its politics. In this light, the tendency for postwar engaged 
Buddhist groups to be anti­establishment and apolitical is a result of increas­
ing secularism86 and new geopolitical realities for religious organizations; 
it is not an innate orientation of socially engaged Buddhism. Transnational 
action in the postwar context increasingly demands a “non-governmental” 
and “apolitical” positioning—although a resistance to private religion re-
mains strong (see Huang’s contribution to this issue). Politically speaking, 
if we set aside a few significant exceptions in mainland Southeast Asia and 
Taiwan, Buddhism has been pushed out, has lost moral capital, has been 
suppressed or persecuted in significant ways throughout Asia, and remains 
a marginal minority in the West.
Existing scholarly definitions emphasize the postwar period, but it is clear 
to us that both earlier and later twentieth century groups and leaders should 
be included. In the cases of Japan and China, the first socially engaged Bud-
dhists appeared very early, during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. We expect a roughly contemporaneous emergence in other parts of 
Asia. To be clear, and despite the examples that we have given, we are not 
arguing for any particular ideological framework, whether conservative or 
progressive, nationalistic or cosmopolitan, only that the analytic category 
85 The critique of charity is interesting in the sense that while the approach to action has 
been reimagined, the relationship of donor and recipient reconsidered, the actual action of 
passing food, clothing, shelter, and care from one pair of hands to another has not. For a very 
recent version of this critique of paternalistic charity, see Birnbaum 2009.
86 Ji, although critical of Zhao’s formulations, agrees that secularization has increased: 
“Finally, serving political power constitutes an open assent to the state’s appropriation of Bud-
dhism’s symbolic resources. It exacerbates the secularization of Buddhism in a way that is, no 
doubt, different from the violent deprivation and devastation of Buddhist properties during the 
pre­Reform era, but that still results in a desacralization of the religion and a loss of control of 
the Buddhist establishment’s own resources” (p. 48, below).
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87 Main 2012.
88 Ji, p. 38, below.
of “socially engaged Buddhism” ought to include those frameworks when 
they have certain features. Asserting that all socially engaged groups must 
be pacifist is the equivalent of a scholar of American religions stating that 
Christian social engagement only exists on the political left but not the polit-
ical right. As well, our revised definition makes it easier to consider older, 
established, sectarian organizations and sub­groups as potential locations 
of social engagement. This reminds us that large Buddhist groups can be 
heterogeneous, containing factions that advocate engagement, even if the 
group as a whole displays other orientations. In Main’s view, the large Shin 
Buddhist sects in Japan display precisely this kind of heterogeneity.87
In sum, we recommend that scholars use “socially engaged” as a label for 
any Buddhist group, or faction within a larger group, where there is an erasure 
of boundaries that separate Buddhist belief, practice, and organ izational life 
from activities considered morally relevant to modern secular society and 
its governance. It is properly found wherever Buddhism qua Buddhism is 
consciously linked to the political functions of the nation­state or its public 
sector tasks: such as education, healthcare, counseling, relief, and so on. 
However laudable, being morally upright alone does not make one socially 
engaged. With this new definition in mind, both the younger and the elder 
Nhat Hanh, both early twentieth century Buddhist reformers and late twentieth 
century Buddhist anti-nuclear activists, have the potential to be socially 
engaged. To close this essay, let us present brief summaries of the essays 
contributed to this volume by Ji, Huang, Watts on Hakamata, and Goldberg.
Ji Zhe, in his essay, “Zhao Puchu and His Renjian Buddhism,” looks at 
the controversial figure Zhao Puchu (1907–2000), who was one of the most 
important figures in the state-sanctioned Buddhist Association of China (BAC) 
in post-Mao China. Zhao, in his role as president of the BAC, re-invented 
“Buddhism for the human [world]” (renjian fojiao) for a socialist China. 
First, Ji argues that the so­called renjian fojiao in socialist China bears lit­
tle resemblance to Taixu’s vision. Second, in the 1970s and 1980s, renjian 
fojiao was given a Marxist, against its earlier nationalist, meaning. Renjian 
Buddhism came to mean the production of a socialist utopia, a Marxist “pure 
land on earth,” under the benevolent guidance of the Communist Party’s 
policies on religion.88 For Ji, as for Queen, without distance from, and 
criticism of, the state, a Buddhist movement cannot be counted as socially 
engaged. The issue for Ji is manifold: Zhao’s Buddhism is not “autonomous” 
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and free of state control, it lacks an ideology supporting “peace, justice, 
and freedom,” and denouncing political oppression.89 Ji’s reticence to label 
Zhao engaged, however, also has a structural dimension which deserves 
attention. He shows how, despite similarities in form, the same concrete rec­
ommendations by both Taixu and Zhao served radically different purposes 
because of their deployment in different social contexts. Taixu makes his 
recommendations to achieve the advance of Buddhism into all areas of 
social and political life, while Zhao makes his to conform Buddhism to the 
state so that it could provide political legitimacy.90 The crux of the issue 
is that one cannot fight political oppression as part of a political system, 
and if fighting oppression is essential to social engagement, groups that 
are imbricated with the state cannot be engaged.91 However, Zhao’s “three 
excellent traditions” of agricultural labor, academic study, and international 
diplomatic exchange,92 because they elaborate concrete and specific actions 
that Buddhists ought to undertake, and because these traditions are “the 
most important” or “only” substance of Buddhism for Zhao, make a case 
for viewing him as engaged. Indeed, we see socialism as an easy fit with the 
moral narrative of social engagement: both view society as fundamentally 
unjust, in need of revolutionary change, and oriented towards a utopian 
ideal. Yet, Ji argues that the deep connections between Zhao’s “three 
excellent traditions” and Communist Party policy make it impossible to see 
him as socially engaged.
Julia Huang, setting aside the question of who is and who is not socially 
engaged, turns her attention to the way in which certain groups exist and 
function. Drawing on studies of social network formation and trust,93 Huang 
suggests the term “spiritual capital” as a way to understand the conditions 
for the arising and functioning of a transnational socially engaged Buddhist 
movement, the Ciji (Tzu Chi), especially in terms of its New York and 
Malacca branches.94 Spiritual capital “refers to assets in religion­facilitated 
social networks” which are maintained by symbols as well as pragmatic 
resources.95 In “Buddhism and its Trust Networks between Taiwan, Malay­
sia, and the United States,” she sheds light on the dynamic process in which 
89 Ji, p. 48, below.
90 Ibid., p. 44.
91 Ibid., p. 50.
92 Ibid., p. 41.
93 Huang, p. 60, below. 
94 Ibid., pp. 59–62.
95 Ibid., p. 61.
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spiritual capital, in the form of trust networks, is created and circulated 
transnationally.
The Buddhist Ciji Foundation is very active in the areas of healthcare and 
disaster relief. Ciji is able to be active, Huang asserts, because it is a religion, 
and so possesses “spiritual capital,” such that it fosters trust networks both 
locally and translocally. For Ciji, this represents “an ongoing process of 
transforming an ethnic religious association into both localized community 
service and an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) that are 
not limited by ethnic boundaries.”96 In other words, these networks are 
necessary to mobilize and motivate Ciji members for social action, whether it 
is fundraising for a new hospital or organizing material and human resources 
for earthquake relief. Through her case studies of members in what she 
calls the Ciji “diaspora” in Malaysia and New York, Huang argues that 
Ciji has successfully created a new “homeland” of religious identity in 
Taiwan in lieu of the traditional cultural homeland in mainland China. In 
her essay, Huang demonstrates that social engagement in Ciji is actually 
built atop “traditional” or “interior” Buddhist practices.97 If true for other 
groups, her work suggests a model for understanding how traditional 
practices, normally criticized as disengaged, can potentially undergird 
social engagement. Huang further indicates that the growth of Ciji networks 
is strong where trust in traditional Buddhist practices and networks has 
declined.98 And last, it deserves mention that for those movements or 
individuals that attempt to act transnationally within the secular sphere of a 
state which is not their own, whether Ciji volunteers in Sichuan or engaged 
pilgrims at Bodhgayā, an apolitical stance is necessary for action.
Jonathan Watts introduces and translates an essay by Hakamata Shun’ei 
袴田俊英 (b. 1958) entitled, “From a Disconnected Society to an Intercon­
nected Society.” This essay is a socially engaged Buddhist treatment of the 
domestic Japanese problem of suicide and “dying alone” (Jp. koritsu shi 孤
立死), providing a typical socially engaged analysis of social problems as 
having widespread and structural causes. Further, Watts’s introduction by 
describing the way in which Hakamata and other socially engaged Bud­
dhists created organizations and practices, provides a typical example of the 
tendency to mobilize in organized and systematic ways to address social 
problems. Watts traces the emergence of this mobilization, which connects 
96 Huang, p. 63, below.
97 Ibid., p. 71.
98 Ibid., p. 75.
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Buddhist priests who had been grappling with the problem as dispersed 
individuals. He notes in particular the role played by the International Bud-
dhist Exchange Center (Kokusai Bukkyō Kōryū Sentā 国際仏教交流センター , 
Yokohama) in facilitating what is today known as the Association of Bud­
dhist Priests Confronting Self­death and Suicide (Jishi, Jisatsu ni Mukiau 
Sōryo no Kai 自死・自殺に向き合う僧侶の会), an organization with forty­two 
priest and nun members as of March 2014. Referring to Buddhist priests in 
the postwar period as “deeply marginalized,” Watts describes the associ­
ation as “an extremely important shift for Buddhist priests and organizations 
in developing meaningful social roles in contemporary Japanese society.”99
What is important here is that both Watts and Hakamata emphasize the 
way that systemic problems and systematic solutions are mutually related. 
In its earliest form, despite cooperative efforts in terms of letter-writing, 
emergency counseling, support networks, special memorials, and group 
sharing, Watts asserts that the association did not address the structural and 
social nature of suicide, nor did it have a vision of a “society without sui-
cide.”100 It was the accumulated experience of member priests and nuns 
dealing with suicidal individuals in crisis that became the basis for under-
standing its structural causes and developing a vision of how society should 
change. Hakamata today understands suicide as one outcome of the “core 
issue of isolation”101 in rural areas, a result of the concrete processes of 
capitalism, mechanization of agriculture, housing modernization, economic 
downturn and increasing debt, migrant labor, depopulation, aging, poverty, 
physical marginalization, and lack of access. Isolation can only be addressed 
via the “process of entanglement,” purposefully creating connections, rela-
tionships, and bonds between people,102 which local Buddhists have begun 
to do by making space for drop­in (Jp. yottetamore よってたもれ) afternoon 
and evening gatherings. Hakamata is optimistic that action on the basis 
of this structural understanding might have contributed to the measurable 
reduction of suicide in his hometown.
The last article in this special issue takes us from East to South Asia, 
and to a group of Buddhist practitioners not normally considered socially 
engaged. Kory Goldberg, in “Pilgrimage Re­oriented: Buddhist Discipline, 
Virtue, and Engagement in Bodhgayā,” describes a new form of pilgrimage, 
99 Watts, p. 79, below.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 84.
102 Ibid., p. 94.
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“socially engaged pilgrimage,” that he observed during his fieldwork in 
Bihar. Although pilgrimage is usually seen as a religious journey that 
takes the pilgrim away from society to travel elsewhere—and as such, a 
disen gaged religious practice—Goldberg explores the way that Buddhist 
pilgrims to Bodhgayā become engaged at the destination site, especially in 
the areas of health and education. He investigated field sites associated with 
the Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition (FPMT), a 
transnational Buddhist group of the Kagyu school that runs several insti-
tutions at Bodhgayā, particularly focusing on their schools and clinics.103 
He interviewed a set of socially engaged pilgrims who had come to work 
with these institutions. He argues that attention to the activities of this sub-
set of pilgrims is necessary for understanding contemporary Buddhist pil­
grimage as a whole.
These engaged pilgrims view their charitable and other activities at 
Bodhgayā as integral to their practice as Buddhists and to the performance 
of pilgrimage itself. Goldberg traces the way that engaged pilgrims situate 
their social activity at Bodhgayā in the larger framework of Buddhist ethics 
and explores how they relate to local politics and development policy. The 
pilgrims Goldberg discusses are marginalized such that they cannot both 
criticize local or national politics and retain access to the site. This is much 
the same situation as Ciji volunteers, when they attempt to act trans nationally 
in mainland China, for example. In both cases, the potential to lose access to 
the site of social activity makes political criticism difficult or impossible.
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